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WHO SHOULD TALK? WHAT COUNTS
AS EMPLOYEE VOICE AND WHO
STANDS TO GAIN
ADITI BAGCHI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The boundaries between labor law and corporate law have long limited the
perceived remedies to improve both employee well-being and corporate
performance. Professor Dau-Schmidt’s paper looks beyond these barriers and
proposes a number of reforms he believes will simultaneously benefit
American workers, in their capacity as employees, and the American
economy as a whole.
His reforms are motivated by “the under-representation of employee voice
in the American economy,” which he describes as the underlying cause of
present deficiencies.1 He envisions that promoting union representation will
promote an existing, but underused, avenue for employee voice.2 He also
proposes requiring employee representation on boards of directors.3
Employee voice is an ambiguous concept. Professor Dau-Schmidt uses it
primarily in reference to what I will call “hard voice” as opposed to “soft
voice.” That is, he uses voice not to encompass all avenues of expression and
communication in the workplace, but rather those forms in which the speaker
may back up the persuasive force of her views with some measure of power.
I believe Professor Dau-Schmidt overstates the value of even these
supposedly more forceful variants of employee voice. In particular, while
barriers between labor law and corporate law have artificially restricted our
vision regarding the means available to promote either employee well-being
or corporate performance, those two ends are genuinely competitive in many
contexts. Serving both purposes simultaneously is politically appealing, but
usually implausible. Employee voice is not a panacea with which one can
reconcile genuine conflicts of interest. In fact, it is not clear whether the
* Aditi Bagchi, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to
Paul Secunda and editors at the law review for organizing the symposium and inviting me to
participate. Thanks to Ken Dau-Schmidt for his paper and all other commentators for a stimulating
discussion.
1. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for
Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 767 (2011).
2. Id. at 828–31.
3. Id. at 824-25.
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reforms Professor Dau-Schmidt envisions will achieve substantial gains, even
if workers’ interests were conceived separately from those of other corporate
stakeholders.
However, there is one type of voice whose value Professor Dau-Schmidt
may actually understate—the right to information. Rights to information,
which sometimes accompany rights of consultation and notice, are only
abstractly recognizable as a form of “voice.” Despite facing formidable
obstacles to implementation in most contexts, this form of voice is probably
more attainable than other forms of voice that Professor Dau-Schmidt
advocates. It may also improve employee well-being more than additional and
seemingly more arduous requirements that might be imposed on corporations.
Employee voice is valued for many reasons. Those reasons which have
little to do with welfare improvements—for workers or anyone else—are less
sensitive to the concerns raised here. For many people, voice is intrinsically
valuable. We spend a large number of our waking hours at work, and the
absence of opportunities for self-expression and engagement during that time
is depressing, if not dehumanizing. Many of the arguments for participation
in institutional design and policy-making in the political sphere carry over to
the workplace as well.4
In light of these benefits of voice, the promotion of employee voice is a
worthwhile and welcome endeavor. Few have Professor Dau-Schmidt’s
breadth and depth of understanding of the context in which these reforms
would take place. He has written about numerous dimensions of labor and
corporate law, and he provides his insights regarding how labor markets and
corporate structures function to bear on the question of institutional design.
But Professor Dau-Schmidt does not rely on non-instrumental grounds to
justify his project. Instead, his arguments are rooted in the positive
consequences he anticipates will flow from enhancing employee voice.5 Most
advocates of similar policies emphasize the benefits that workers can expect
to accrue, but Professor Dau-Schmidt makes a more ambitious case. Professor
Dau-Schmidt posits that corporations themselves, conceived as complex
4. Consider classic arguments regarding the importance of participation in public life, and in
politics in particular, to human flourishing. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 3 (Benjamin Jowett, trans.,
Forgotten Books 2007) (1885); see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: RepublicanOriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 329,
340 (1994) (describing reliance on Aristotle by Republic legal theorists and proponents of
deliberative democracy). For a contemporary discussion of the importance of public participation in
public administration, see generally Michael P. Smith, Alienation and Bureaucracy: The Role of
Participatory Administration, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 658 (1971). For one recent analysis of the
politics-union analogy, see Thomas Tso, The “Political Marketplace” Metaphor from a Labor
Perspective, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 831, 878–79 (2009).
5. Id. at 800–09.
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amalgamations of interests, also stand to benefit from enhanced employee
voice.6 I suggest that we be skeptical about the net welfare benefits of
employee voice to either corporations or employees. As a general matter, we
should think less about what employees have to say and more about what they
need to hear.
II. VOICE AS A POWER
The notion of employee voice is ambiguous. Here, I will use it to describe
three methods by which employees might exercise some control over the
ways they are affected by the policies and fortunes of their employers. First,
“hard” voice refers to the ability to exercise power and shape the direction of
the firm and its treatment of employees in particular. Second, “soft” voice
refers to the ability to engage in dialogue with or provide feedback to the
relevant decision-makers. Finally, access to information, while not an
obvious form of employee voice, is an alternative means for employees to
control how their employment disrupts or advances their lives and life
projects—but not the acts and policies of corporations.
In the first usage, employee voice means “say,” as in power. This use of
the term voice is a bit euphemistic because the notion of power arguably
better characterizes what people seek with this type of “voice.” The
conflation of voice with power envisions a particular process of corporate
decision-making. This approach pretends that decisions are the product of
reasoned deliberations among parties, each of whose view is taken into
account to the extent that it illuminates problems to be solved. In such a
model of deliberation, the gap between voice and power shrinks because the
exercise of voice, or the opportunity to communicate ideas to the deliberating
body, naturally translates into influence over the outcomes of those
deliberations. In this view, voice implies a seat at the table, and were the
parties at the corporate table truly engaged in reasoned deliberation, it would
be enough to assure influence and a modicum of control.
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s own portrait of the internal processes of
corporations suggests a trough more than a table. But part of his aim is to
rearrange processes to facilitate more rational decision-making. Bringing
labor to the table is a large part of that project.
Professor Dau-Schmidt proposes two methods for increasing employee
voice in this sense: (1) increasing both access to unions and access by unions,
and (2) giving workers direct representation on corporate boards of directors.7
His arguments tend to focus on the benefits these changes would bring to

6. Id.
7. Id. at 824-31.
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corporations.8 I will address these proposed reforms’ likelihood for success in
light of their impact on both workers and firms “as a whole,” because such
proposed reforms are usually motivated by worker interests in particular.
A.

Promoting Unionization to Enhance Worker Voice

Professor Dau-Schmidt argues that active union engagement will help
bring productivity-enhancing ideas to the right decision-making tables within
companies.9 Presently, workers may make proposals to their immediate
supervisors, but the latter often have little incentive to relay suggestions to
someone within the company capable of acting on the proposals.10
Alternatively, and just as likely, the supervisors themselves lack the power to
transmit ideas to an appropriate person within the prevailing corporate
hierarchy, let alone the ability to directly effectuate a recommendation. The
result is that workers have no reason to consider how their operations could be
improved, nor any reason to articulate and give voice to their formed ideas.
By contrast, unions would have incentive to listen to their members’ ideas
because acting as a source of efficiency-enhancing ideas would elevate their
status as bargaining partners. Any marginal improvement in productivity
would also give unions more leverage to push their own demands on behalf of
workers. Thus, unions are relatively well-placed for soliciting, taking
seriously, processing, and then advocating productivity-enhancing ideas
generated by their membership.11
Unions monitor the workplace—from shopfloor operations to accounting
practices, and from worker attitudes to boardroom dynamics. They provide
this oversight to promote and monitor the interests of their members, which is
their primary function.12 In doing so, they are also able to serve as eyes and
ears for the underlying interests of the corporation.13 Professor Dau-Schmidt
8. Id. at 769-771.
9. Id. at 805.
10. See Mark Fenton-O’Creevy, Employee Involvement and the Middle Manager: Evidence
from a Survey of Organizations, 19 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 67, 81 (1998).
11. See William N. Cooke, Employee Participation Programs, Group-Based Incentives, and
Company Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 594, 597–98
(1994) (noting employee participation may result in greater productivity gains in unionized
workplaces).
12. See Armen A. Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory
of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 235, 243–44 (1982);
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 319, 357–58 (2005); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315–16 (1978); David Weil, Enforcing
OSHA: The Role of Labor Unions, 30 INDUS. REL. 20, 21 (1991); Diane E. Lewis, Unions Seeking
Leverage as Shareholders, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1996, at 71, 75.
13. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:

2011]

WHO SHOULD TALK?

843

emphasizes that those interests may be diverted by management, who often
prove to be imperfect agents. Management ostensibly oversees workers on
behalf of shareholders, but workers may provide valuable oversight of
management through unions.
There are a number of potential problems with this form of voice. The
most immediate obstacle is that unions are currently a minor presence in the
private labor market.14 But this objection is somewhat defeatist because
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s point is precisely that the benefits unions generate
should motivate us to lower obstacles to union certification and strengthen
their hand once on the scene.
But there are other problems, especially with Professor Dau-Schmidt’s
choice to defend these proposals on the grounds that they will enhance
corporate performance. Whether unions increase worker productivity and
improve corporate performance are extremely broad questions that cannot be
adequately treated in this article. But these are empirical questions, and while
there are almost certainly some corporate settings in which unions can play a
positive role—independent of their effect on worker compensation and quality
of work life—there are surely others where the gains that unions achieve for
their members come at the expense of company competitiveness. The
looming task is to identify the conditions under which union interests better
align with shareholder interests. Professor Dau-Schmidt has yet to detail
those conditions. Are there particular kinds of work environments in which
unions are best suited to play a public-interest role? Are there work
arrangements in which productivity is enhanced by worker input as mediated
by unions? When are other means of communication between workers and
management ineffective, such that unions contribute marginally more?
Inconsistent studies regarding the effect of unions on worker productivity
suggest that the truth of the matter lies in the details.15 While there may be
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1021–24 (1998); Randall S. Thomas
& Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1021, 1036 (1999).
14. Last year labor unions represented only 7.2% of the private sector workforce. Press
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members - 2009 (Jan. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01222010.pdf.
15. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 7–22
(1984); John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has
the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 84 (1989); Carliss Y. Baldwin, Productivity and Labor
Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts, 56 J. BUS., 155, 159 (1983); Kim
B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance: The Impact on Profits, Growth, and Productivity, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 893, 915 (1984); Christos Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, What Do Unions Do to
Productivity? A Meta-Analysis, 42 INDUS. REL. 650, 670–71 (2003); Sheldon Friedman & Christian
Weller, One More Time: Labor Market Flexibility, Aggregate Demand, and Comparative
Employment Growth in the U.S. and Europe, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 307, 314 (1998); Victor
R. Fuchs et al., Economists’ Views About Parameters, Values, and Policies: Survey Results in Labor
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settings where unions play the role that Professor Dau-Schmidt suggests, it
seems likely that unions can play that role only when all the stars are aligned.
Not all workplaces are equally hospitable to unions as corporate players.
Unions may consistently achieve benefits for workers in their compensation
and advance their interests relative to other corporate stakeholders, but that
very fact creates a prima facie case for their negative effect on corporate
competitiveness.
Alleged gains to corporate performance stem from
improvements in worker motivation and tenure on the one hand, and
improved production design on the other. That unions would enhance worker
morale and perhaps worker tenure is logical, but in many cases worker
productivity is driven by production design, not the characteristics of workers.
Claims about how workers can enhance productive processes are more
tenuous. The plausibility of these claims—and any empirical study
supporting them—will turn on the precise causal mechanisms by which they
will improve productivity and the frequency with which those mechanisms
can be expected to play out in different work contexts. Both have yet to be
identified with specificity.
Even if unions do prove to be an effective means to improve corporate
performance in various respects, unions almost certainly do so at some cost.
And it is not realistic to think that those costs will only be borne by rich but
incompetent managers, at whose expense unions will institute needed
corporate reforms.
Professor Dau-Schmidt is surely right to ask policymakers to learn a
lesson from recent experience and to “help” shareholders withdraw from their
asymmetrical love affair with grossly overcompensated management.
Managers are sometimes awarded fantastic compensation packages with little
or no ties to their job performance and at times undertake projects that appear
better suited to promoting their immediate public stature and short-term
option values than preserving long-term shareholder value. Professor DauSchmidt is rightly dissatisfied with the means proposed by most scholars to
reign in managers.
Most scholars rely on tools that are specifically targeted to the problem of
executive compensation.16 Some proposals have an uncomfortable retroactive
dimension.17 Adopted reforms, which require disinterested parties to
and Public Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 1387, 1392, 1418 (1998); Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions
Do for Economic Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 430–31 (2004).
16. For an overview of the problem of executive compensation, see Jerry W. Markham,
Regulating Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 278–82
(2007).
17. See Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 111,
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scrutinize compensation in good faith, have failed to curtail rising
compensation packages, perhaps because such disinterested persons are
difficult to locate and the model may wrongly assume that astronomical
compensation is always the product of inside-dealing and bad faith.18 One
may fear that tax policies intended to curtail executive compensation will be
circumvented, if not entirely elminated after the next election (indeed, they
are unlikely since the last election).19 While many proposed reforms are
commendable, many (but obviously not all) are narrow in their ambition and
do not seem aimed at reforming the decision-making process that gives rise to
excessive executive compensation. Professor Dau-Schmidt is correct to dig
deeper, and is persuasive that the best way to temper the runaway benefits and
power of management is to elevate a competing interest within the
corporation. He is also persuasive in his argument that labor is wellmotivated and well-positioned to play this oversight role.
However, highlighting the conflict of interest between shareholders and
management, and the extent to which corporate law continues to struggle with
regulating this principal-agent relationship, does not detract from the conflict
of interest that also exists between shareholders and workers. As Professor
Dau-Schmidt admits, alliances within a given corporate community are fluid
and shifting. Employees of a corporation may help keep management in
check, but sometimes employees have common interests with management,
such as keeping a corporation afloat, that shareholders may not share.
Shareholders may benefit when workers strengthen the former’s hand against
management, but workers often find themselves facing a wall formed by an
alliance of shareholders and managers because shareholders may also lose by
conceding power to unions. After all, it is not just managers’ compensation
that comes out of shareholders’ pockets. And while shareholders may want to
monitor and improve the “value-add” of their managers, they also wish to
increase the marginal productivity of workers in ways that can be inconsistent
with workers’ interests. The cheapest and quickest way to increase
112, 125–26 (2010); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration of
Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135, 1147–51 (2010). Even contract provisions that
are ostensibly prospective usually authorize clawback on highly uncertain conditions that the parties
do not fully or unilaterally control, such that many of the fairness concerns that might plague
clawbacks remain. See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective
Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 368, 372–73, 380–84 (2009).
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring independent compensation committees in
exchange-traded firms); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 75–78 (1992) (critiquing committee solution).
19. For some tax proposals that address excess compensation, see Meredith R. Conway, Money
for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 383, 391–419 (2008).
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productivity is to require workers to work longer hours without increasing
compensation. This has indeed been the favored strategy of American
corporations.20
Unfortunately, this strategy has become our national
comparative advantage in certain sectors. None of this bodes well for an
initiative to persuade shareholders that it is ultimately in their best interest to
allocate a larger share of power within the corporation to worker
representatives.
One might attempt to locate an argument that strengthening the hand of
unions will improve corporate performance in a larger effort to shift the
source of the United States’ comparative advantage in global markets. But
that argument requires a longer discussion in directions that Professor DauSchmidt does not pursue in his paper. Likely, Professor Dau-Schmidt has a
more fundamental reason for his confidence that his proposed reforms will
benefit the American Company: his conception of corporate interests.
If we were to reconceive the American corporation as an animal apart
from the familiar model trumpeted by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, i.e.,
privileging interests other than those of its shareholders,21 then perhaps the
direction in which Professor Dau-Schmidt’s reforms would lead firms is
indeed the best trajectory for corporations. But while corporate law literature
debates the preeminence of the Berle-Means model,22 corporate and securities
law tends to consistently assess the conduct of corporate agents, including
management, by reference to shareholder interests.23
One of the chief justifications for this focus on shareholders’ interests is
the sheer simplicity of identifying a single group whose interests are to be
managed. In reality, the interests of shareholders as a group are quite varied,
20. See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 59 (2003); LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE
OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009, at 128 tbl.3.2, 365 (2009).
21. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008). See generally
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER M. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 1–18 (photo reprint 1982) (1932).
22. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizen United,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 169–70 (2010); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle
and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 179–80, 185
(2005). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 671 (1995); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s
Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1681–82 (1988); Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The
Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOC’Y 579 (2004).
23. SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969) (referring to “paramount federal interest
in protecting shareholders”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 (Del. Ch.
1988) (describing a breach of the duty of loyalty as a failure to act in the good faith pursuit of the
shareholders’ interests).
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consisting of shareholders with long-term and short-term interests, and with
varying degrees of exposure, diversification, and risk tolerance.24 But
pointing to the existing diversity of interests within the corporation and
expanding it for the sake of completeness creates an ad hoc list of interests.
And equating all of those interests with the new “corporate interest” is a risky
enterprise because it renders still more complex and unpredictable any effort
to assess the internal or external governance of corporations. Recognizing
these varied interests as co-equal also obscures real challenges in institutional
design.
Allowing space for competitive markets to function while
empowering workers to exact their fair share of its fruits has been a
worldwide struggle for centuries, and it cannot be resolved by wishing the
divergence of interest away. If we conceive corporate interests more
inclusively, we will require another mechanism to sort them that allows us to
prioritize some interests in certain contexts while allowing others to prevail at
other decision points. The underlying conflict of interest is real. Professor
Dau-Schmidt rightly emphasizes that it is not the case that managers and
shareholders are naturally aligned against workers. Sometimes shareholders
and workers have interests in common that oppose managers’ interests. But
there are also instances where managers and workers have common interests
against shareholders. There are also circumstances when each of these
groups’ interests align with taxpayers or consumers and not with each other.
We should not reveal the artificiality of any one arrangement of interests only
to reify another. Interests are fluid and there is no permanent, natural alliance
of workers with any one group of corporate stakeholders.
The challenge is to understand the options in terms of institutional design:
the outcomes for various groups associated with each possible arrangement.
More challenging still will be the normative choices we must make between
these constellations of outcomes. Professor Dau-Schmidt risks glossing over
the reality of these challenges by sometimes writing as though realigning the
corporation to accommodate a wider set of interests—and demoting the
interests of spoiled managers in particular—is adequate to resolve real
tensions and troubles.
Increasing workers’ opportunities to voice ideas and concerns by
strengthening unions would also make sense if it could at least be expected to
benefit workers themselves. But while unions may achieve a number of gains
for workers by strengthening their position vis-à-vis employers, worker
benefits that specifically result from an opportunity to participate in corporate
decision-making largely depend on whether their contributions enhance
24. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 561, 577 (2006); Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1355, 1372–80 (2010).
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corporate performance in the first instance. As discussed above, this
assumption seems dubious.
Unions are a valuable tool inasmuch as they enable workers to exact
concessions from employers, or as discussed below, inasmuch as they
empower workers to extract information from firms. But these benefits of
unions are not best described as instances of employee voice. Voice may be
conceived as a mechanism of power under certain conditions of corporate
decision-making. Unions neither participate in truly deliberative processes
(because they do not exist) nor help bring such processes into existence; they
win benefits for workers through the exercise of raw power. Their role is not
aptly characterized as facilitating employee voice. Unions are more likely to
be good for workers than other corporate stakeholders, and even the gains
they achieve should not be understood as benefits of employee voice.
B.

Worker Representation on Corporate Boards

Professor Dau-Schmidt argues that corporate performance can also be
achieved in part through employee representation on boards of directors.
Such representation would give workers direct say; they could act as a
counterpoint to the undue influence of management, and; they would offer a
long-term perspective that would ultimately benefit not only employees but
also shareholders and other stakeholders.
The proposal for employee representation on corporate boards is
reminiscent of German co-determination, as Professor Dau-Schmidt himself
observes.25
German co-determination involves this type of worker
consultation and worker participation in plant-level decision-making through
works councils.26 Unlike participation on supervisory boards, works council
legislation was met with initial resistance from unions, who feared that they
would function as alternatives to unions.27 Of course, both forms of codetermination—supervisory board participation and works councils—also met
resistance from corporations, who feared that the interests of propertyowners—banks, shareholders and other owners of corporations—would be
compromised.
Both forms of co-determination are now well regarded as successes and
have expanded beyond initial requirements.28 Worker representation on

25. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [Participation Act], May 4, 1976, BGBl. I at 1153 (F.R.G.).
26. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [Labor Management Relations Act], Jan. 15, 1972, BGBl. I at 13
(F.R.G.).
27. Kathleen A. Thelen, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTWAR GERMANY 64 (1991).
28. See Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences of
Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 305, 325–28 (2008).
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supervisory boards is the less glorified of the two dimensions of co–
determination, given that shareholders retain the deciding vote and important
decisions are perceived to be made in subcommittees, on which employees
might not be represented. But companies have managed to succeed in
competitive markets and have arguably adapted to transform perceived
handicapping decision-process requirements into a comparative advantage.29
Works councils are considered essential, and companies heavily rely upon
them to negotiate the specific needs of particular locations and plants as they
may deviate from the standardized plans and obligations negotiated at the
corporate or industry level.30
But both levels of co–determination, supervisory board participation and
works councils, have relied heavily on unions as a mediating institution. Most
candidates for both boards and councils are sponsored by the industry union.31
Arguably, election procedures are especially favorable to unions because they
make it difficult for lesser-known candidates to establish a foothold in general
elections. The result is that little disunity among employee interests finds
expression. Whether at the collective bargaining stage, in the supervisory
board, or in works councils, unions are an established presence with the
institutional clout and wherewithal to navigate corporate politics and fractious
divisions among employees. It is doubtful, or at least unknown, whether
employee “voice” in Germany would operate so efficiently and effectively
were unions not well-established and accepted players on many fronts within
corporations.
Of course, in the vast majority of workplaces in the United States, unions
are entirely absent. And when they do exist, they simply do not enjoy the
same prestige and clout that enables German unions to resolve divisions
within the groups they represent. American unions have been restricted to a
small role for various reasons, including protecting their integrity (restrictions
on cooperation with management stem from such concerns) and their
legitimacy (restrictions on the size of bargaining units, the scope of their
powers, and the procedures to which they are subject in order to maintain
certification also stem from such concerns). The consequence is that
American unions are not equipped to play the role that German unions play in
German co–determination, and we cannot take the German experience as
grounds for optimism about similar proposed forms of direct employee
representation in the United States.
29. Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in Developed Democracies, in VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 71, 76, 92 (Peter
A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
30. Wolfgang Streeck, Industrial Relations in West Germany: Agenda for Change, in
Forschungsschwerpunkt Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung (IIMV) 4–5 (1987).
31. Thelen, supra note 33, at 78–80.
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Employee representation on corporate boards presents many questions. If
employees were granted representation on corporate boards, how would
employees select those representatives? Would all employees have a single
representative? Would that representative be elected by all employees or
some subgroup, for example, those employees over whom the National Labor
Relations Board exercises jurisdiction, or employees covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act? If legitimacy concerns have plagued unions, even
while operating under the requirement of homogenous bargaining units, how
will a single representative representing a diverse spectrum of employees be
perceived as legitimate by her own constituency, let alone her colleagues on a
board? Will not there be worries that she will consistently privilege some
groups of employees over the interests of others? Will corporations be
permitted to appoint the employee representative themselves, simply ascribing
to that person certain fiduciary obligations, in a manner comparable to the role
of trustees overseeing employee stock option plans? The more accountable an
employee representative, the more hobbled she will be by paralyzing divisions
among employees. The more unleashed she is to rise above those factions, the
less legitimacy she will be perceived to possess, and the less effective an
advocate she will be.
If unions were a stronger presence in the American workplace, they would
lend some of their prestige and credibility to the new institution of worker
representation on corporate boards. As in Germany, they could harness
existing practices for mediating conflicts of interests among their membership
and still apply substantial pressure on behalf of their positions on questions of
corporate policy and direction. But this is not the institutional environment
we presently face. As a result, more needs to be said regarding how a system
of direct employee representation on boards would credibly and effectively
function.
III. “SOFT” EMPLOYEE VOICE: THE VALUE AND LIMITS OF EXPRESSION AS A
TOOL OF REFORM
Professor Dau-Schmidt also uses the notion of employee voice to describe
opportunities for employees to convey their ideas and opinions. In contrast to
how the notion of employee voice was employed in the previous section, this
kind of employee voice creates opportunities for expression. “Soft” employee
voice does not necessarily involve the exercise of any power or control by
employees or their representatives. In principle, a box where employees can
drop their comments and suggestions is an example of such a mechanism for
employee voice. In practice, whether such a mechanism is at all effective will
depend on the incentives that lower-level and upper-level management have
to take those suggestions seriously, and there is a fine line between incentives
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for management and lines of power enjoyed by employees.
Where there is truly nothing but bare opportunity, unbacked by any
mechanism for influence or control, these types of employee voice are
unlikely to encounter a great deal of opposition, except where procedures
incorporate notice periods and other delays. But it also seems unlikely that
reforms intended to encourage these forms of voice will bring about any
important changes in methods of corporate governance, or even micro-level
changes in how a particular plant or factory operates. Bare voice holds the
promise of important efficiency gains only where improvements are easy and
uncontroversial; such low-hanging fruit is likely to have been picked already.
It is possible that in individual cases, workplaces have failed to make
improvements that are costless merely because they have not empowered
workers to contribute ideas that would be accepted and implemented. But
even managers that stand to gain from short-term profits, which come at the
expense of long-term performance, also stand to gain from costless
improvements that increase efficiency of the firm. Little would seem to be
gained from legislative or administrative incentives (which are themselves not
costless) that motivate the firm to adopt those rare measures which everyone
is already motivated to support but which have been simply overlooked.
Professor Dau-Schmidt also appears to join those who are skeptical of the
present obstacles to employee participation in committees and other
collaborative exercises with higher-level employees of a firm. For historical
reasons, American labor law is wary of such venues for employee voice and
views them as “company unions” intended to supplant or ward off “real”
unions.32
Specific examples of apparently benign attempts to establish lines of
communication between employees and management, which were deemed
violative of the NLRA, are the best fuel for relaxing rules on company
domination. Critics of the existing rules also point out that most workforces
are not and will not be unionized in any case, such that it is counterproductive
to limit the forms of cooperation available to all employees just in case some
small fraction of employees join an independent union instead.33
32. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it . . . .” National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006); see also Michael C. Harper,
The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2322, 2324 n.7, 2326–27 (1998).
33. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 134–35 (1994);
Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized
Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 62–63 (1993); Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise
and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What’s Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133,
1152–62 (2007).

852

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[94:839

I do not argue here against such proposals, but only point out that the
adversarial character of labor relations in the United States is not the product
of the rules on company domination.34 Thus, critics of the rules on company
domination that would prefer a more collaborative corporate culture have a
larger task at hand than revising a single provision of the NLRA. Adversarial
culture has multiple sources and manifestations. In our present corporate
culture, even committees and workgroups that are genuinely designed to elicit
employee voice are likely tainted by employees’ rational fear of their
employers’ power. The result may be that these committees are rarely an
effective means for employees to express views and ideas that are not in the
interests of employers. Employee committees might be a relatively
inexpensive mechanism to solicit certain information that will benefit
corporate performance, but not a means by which employees can expect to
advance their own interests within the corporate organization. All of this may
be true, even in the absence of active employer domination, and even where
employers sincerely aspire to learn about workers’ preferences in hopes of
offering competitive compensation and workplace experiences. If the benefits
of employee committees are ultimately limited, they may not outweigh the
risk that in a minority of cases, those committees will be used to shut down
(or will have the inadvertent effect of making less probable) more productive
avenues for employee “voice.” Whatever the ideal corporate culture, within
the ambit of what is possible in the American context, we may come to see
restrictions on certain forms of collaboration as an attainable second-best.

34. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001) (describing an adversarial legal culture that pervades subject matter areas, including
areas of corporate governance that are unrelated to the National Labor Relations Act and its
immediate concerns).
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IV. EMPLOYEES AND INFORMATION
Still another meaning of employee voice is the least natural and the least
utilized, but perhaps the most important. In this last form, voice is not about
speaking to anyone. It is not directed at the employer, who may or may not be
listening, and who may or may not do as one bids. Instead, this notion of
voice describes an attempt at agency. Elevating workers’ sense of agency
may be achieved not just by empowering them to alter the course of
corporations, but also by giving them direct control over what really matters
to them: how the course of corporations affects the course of their own lives.
Banal information about corporate financial health, corporate strategy, and
employment practices can inform the decisions that workers make, which can
in turn improve their experience of employment.
Where voice takes the form of consultation or notice rights, it is
sometimes accompanied by rights to information. This information may
pertain to company finances, performance, plans, policies, and practices
related to the workforce, including labor market data assembled by human
resources staff, hiring and promotion trends, salary and other compensation
data, and heath care and pension options available to the company. Rules
requiring consultation or notice are weak and ineffective in the absence of
rights to such information, but when a company is required to make this kind
of information available to employees, “soft” rights of consultation and notice
may actually be more valuable to employees than the seemingly stronger right
to participate in decision-making through negotiation or representation on
boards or councils. The latter may also be valuable to the extent these rights
are backed by obligations of disclosure and data sharing.
To give a sense of the kind of information I am referring to, consider
employees who are deciding whether to look for employment at another firm.
These employees will be interested in the general financial health of their
employer, but also their particular prospects. If a union is present and is
entitled to relevant data, it may act as a filter and only provide what is most
useful to the employee, or perhaps even offer its assessment of the data. In
the absence of a union, employees would need to have direct access to the
data in some digestible form. For many employees, information about job
prospects, which is essential to an individual’s ability to plan, is probably
more important than a small opportunity to influence those prospects on the
margin. Cynthia Estlund has argued that similar information should be made
systematically available across the labor market.35 But Professor DauSchmidt’s view of the employees’ position within the firm is an opportunity to
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351
(2011).
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understand how each firm might better inform its existing employees, even in
the absence of a government agency that centrally collects, processes, and
distributes this information.
Whether deciding to accept a job, join a union, leave a job, or work
harder, employees consistently lack information that they need to make fair
and efficient decisions for themselves and the labor market. These decisions
might improve corporate performance, but they will at least improve
employees’ positions within firms because employees will be less vulnerable
to a corporation’s economic fortunes and policy changes, which they
presently experience as the unpredictable winds of good or ill fortune.
Even if there are many gains to be realized from requiring companies to
disclose certain categories of data to employees, there remains the question of
who will assemble, check and distribute this information, especially in
nonunionized workplaces. Firms will have legitimate concerns about the
confidentiality of such data. I cannot work out a scheme for data disclosure
here, but only suggest that this dimension of employee voice may warrant
more attention that Professor Dau-Schmidt provides.
V. CONCLUSION
The long-standing project of promoting employee voice in the workplace
is motivated by various concerns. Professor Dau-Schmidt joins the project
with a particular angle, namely, that employee voice is good not just for
employees but also for the corporations that employ them. His contribution
comes at a unique time, when public policy experts should be looking to
retool corporate governance to promote a different set of goals than some
corporate managers appear to have pursued in recent times. Blame for the
most recent recession has been aimed more at banks and, to a lesser extent, at
irresponsible consumers. Main Street, a favorable reference that is generously
applied to the American corporate world and sometimes seems to embrace
retailers and manufacturers, has been perceived as a victim more than in
previous downturns (e.g. the downturn surrounding Enron or the burst of the
dot com bubble). Still, people are probably more receptive to the idea that we
need fundamental reform in the corporate sector than they would be in better
times.
Professor Dau-Schmidt’s contribution is also more ambitious than some
others who have promoted the idea of employee voice as conducive to worker
productivity. But he wears this ambition lightly and does not state it
expressly. The latent ambition is to rewrite the concept of the corporation.
Professor Dau-Schmidt does not ultimately rely only on empirical studies that
may show some worker productivity gains (but are unlikely to be holistic
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assessments of the economic consequences of worker voice). He implicitly
rejects the idea that the corporation and its interests can be identified solely by
reference to an elusive set of shareholders and their inconsistent interests. In
this respect, Professor Dau-Schmidt does capitalize on present discontentment
with capital markets as a mechanism to discipline and rationalize product
markets. Who are the shareholders? Who controls their votes? Who
determines what their interests are, for purposes of corporate decisionmaking? More than ever, we are skeptical that decisions are really being
made by, or even for, the typical shareholder. Instead, shareholder power
seems at times a mask for the power of intermediating financial institutions
that seem insufficiently separable from each other or their regulators. Now it
seems plausible that other stakeholders in the corporation may be as good or
better candidates to anchor the direction of corporations. Workers as a group,
who after all constitute a majority of the population, seem like a natural group
whose interests might direct corporations in a manner that would benefit both
worker and firm.
There is much appeal about this general strategy, but I use this response to
signal caution on two dimensions. First, the isolation of a single interest
group within a corporate community and its elevation to “principal” status
within the corporation, to the extent that its interests are equated with those of
the corporation, was not unmotivated (or, to avoid imputing more
intentionality than warranted to a complex legal evolution, we might say it
was “not without benefits”). Nor was it motivated by a nefarious plot to
overthrow all other interests present within a given corporate context. Rather,
it was a strategy not fully conscious, and not without flaws—to deal with a
genuine conflict of interest among stakeholders in firms by assigning them
separate roles, with separate means by which to exercise influence over
corporate policy. It may be that the role and means assigned to workers in this
institutional arrangement were inadequate. The legal shuffle took place not in
one game of cards, but over the course of many legislative and litigious
contests. There may be ways for worker interests to be better represented.
And a reminder that a firm has no naturally defined interest that is inevitably
in conflict with those of workers is surely a productive exercise. But brushing
aside genuine conflicts, by emphasizing a unity of interest against
incompetent and greedy managers, is potentially distracting from the
challenging task of finding a way to change the winners and losers, even
where some of the new losers are sympathetic and do not inherently deserve
to lose.
Secondly, and more practically, the task of finding new ways for
employees to exercise voice within the firm risks glossing over a more
fundamental problem facing most American workers: they are not even in a
position to know what they should want their employers to do on a range of
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basic matters. First, the “worker interest” on a given matter requires
formulation and negotiation among workers, and we lack institutions (given
the limited presence and restricted potency of unions) capable of mediating
heterogeneous worker interests and forging a common worker interest that is a
plausible and potent counterweight to other interests within a corporate
context. Second, the “worker interest” is not a function of workers’
circumstances and desires but must also reflect facts about the world outside
themselves. An institution capable of forging something called the “worker
interest” must be capable of locating and processing facts about labor markets,
though the facts are not readily available in great detail for any region or
market.
Presently, the worker interest with respect to any specific policy decision
facing the firm is unformed and undeveloped because workers lack
information about the firm itself. How do workers know what they want to be
paid if they do not know the firm’s position in global markets and what the
realistic tradeoffs will be? How do workers know whether they want a firm to
expand employment if they do not know this information? These are the
kinds of decisions in which workers would typically seek to exercise voice
through negotiation. And what about matters for which they might play some
other, collaborative role? How will workers take a position on whether new
technologies should be pursued, without information about those technologies
and their costs, the anticipated actions of competitor firms, or their impact on
future employment?
Once we realize that information is critical to the formulation of worker
interests, which must be formed before voiced, we realize that the very real
conflict of interest I have described between workers and other stakeholders
in a corporation exists on this front as well. The war of (or for) data is another
manifestation of how legitimate interests can collide. Just as surely as
workers have a legitimate interest in accessing data about a firm, its markets,
and its policies, firm managers have an interest in protecting the
confidentiality of this data from competitor firms and, in some cases, from
workers themselves. I do not offer any solution to these conflicts of interest
here, but only identify them as real obstacles in the path of meaningful
reform.

